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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
to the officer's (Italics ours) services." 11 The cases indicative of the trend;
however, appear to be limited to the "special relationship" situation.12 This is
apparently the first case in which such action has been taken regarding the
salary paid to an unrelated employee. A possible reason for the Commissioner's
holding may be found in the Tax Court report on this case. 13 The questioning
of the bookkeeper indicated that the Commissioner may have suspected
fraud;14 however, fraud was not acknowledged as the reason for the decision.
The use of the general term "unreasonable" in this situation, although ap-
parently proper under 23 (a) 1,15 indicates a wide area of control over com-
pensation by the Commissioner. In the absence of a special relationship, and
where there is arm's length bargaining between employer and employee, it is
submitted that the Commissioner should act with extreme caution in sub-
stituting his opinion for that of the parties as to what is a reasonable allow-
ance for salary.
TORTS--SLANDER OF TITLE-ADOPTION OF RESTATEMENT VIEW
IN FLORIDA
Plaintiffs, owners of real property, alleged that the defendants had falsely
and maliciously altered a letter (by adding a legal description over the letter-
head, a jurat, and by subscribing as witnesses) from a third party concerning
construction of a house on plaintiff's land, so as to make it appear to be a
contract of sale. It was also alleged that the defendants then recorded the
letter, thereby slandering the title of the plaitiff; and that as a result the
plaintiffs lost an opportunity of sale and profit. Hetd, that the declaration was
sufficient to maintain an action for slander of title. Lehman v. Goldin, 36 So.
2d 259 (Fla. 1948).
The case, one of first impression in Florida, relied heavily on the Re-
statement of Torts,' which is in accord with the majority view.2 The rule is
11. 1 RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INcOME, GiFT AND ESTATE TAXATION 726
(1947 ed.).
12. Locke Machine Co. v. Comnm'r of Int. Rev., 168 F. 2d 21 (C. C. A. 6th 1948)
(Director-executive officers) ; Taylor & Co. v. Glenn, 62 F. Supp. 495 (W. D. Ky. 1945)
(Stockholder-officers).
13. See note 1 supra.
14. Supra note 1, at 411-"Q. How were the moneys that were paid to you under
this agreement paid? Were they paid to you by check or cash? .. .A,.It was paid to me
by check and I turned around and cashed them. Q. As a matter of fact, many of them
were paid in cash out of large checks that were drawn and used to pay various expenses,
and to pay some money to you and some to either or both of the Pattons? A. Yes....
Q. What did you do with the moneys that were paid to you . . .did you invest them in
anything? A. Why, no .... Q. Did you deposit it in any bank? A. No .... Q. Did
you have some war bonds? A. Yes . . .I don't know how much. Q. What did you do
with the balance? A. I got it. Q. What did you do with it? Where did you keep it?
A. I kept it at home."
15. See note 2 supra; see Note, 56 HARv. L. Rav. 997 (1943).
i. RESTATEMENT, TORTs §§ 624, 625, 626 (1938).
2. Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal. 2d. 537, 134 P. 2d 217 (1943); Greenlake Investment
Co. v. Swarthout, 349 Mo. 232, 161 S. W. 2d 697 (1942) ; Dwelle v. Home Realty and
CASES NOTED
that when one, without privilege to do so, e.g., "maliciously," 3 publishes un-
true and disparaging matter regarding the property of another, which could
foreseeably influence the acts of a third party as to that property, he is liable
for any loss occurring therefrom.
The court cites three rules of the Restatement,4 the first two relating to
slander of title, the last pertaining to disparagement of quality, e.g., trade libel,
without distinguishing as to their applicability to the instant case. While the
first two are applicable the last is not. Although the confusion of trade libel
with slander of title does not affect the result in the present case, it may have
dangerous repercussions in future litigation. The defense of belief in the
truth of the statement is not available in the case of disparagement of property
(slander of title) whether the published matter is in the form of a declaration
of fact or opinion. 5 However, in the case of disparagement of quality (trade
libel) the defense is available only when the statement is one of opinion.6
C'ertain "privileges to do so," e.g., situations denying liability or implied
malice as set forth in the Restatement, are applicable only in actions of slander
of title and not trade libel and vice versa. Being an adverse claimant 7 is a
privilege only available in an action of slander of title, while being a com-
petitor or seeking to protect the health,9 safety or property interests of the
recipient of the publication or third parties 0 is only available in a trade libel
suit.
It is submitted that the instant case leaves a large area of doubt as to how
much of the law set forth in the Restatement relating to trade libel and slander
of title, a field totally devoid of decisions in Florida, has been or will be adopted
by implication from this decision.
Investment Co., 134 Kan. 520, 7 P. 2d 522 (1932) ; Kelly v. First State Bank of Rothsay,
145 Minn. 331, 177 N. W. 347 (1920) ; Coffman v. Henderson, 9 Ala. App. 553, 63 So.
808 (1913); Collins v. Whitehead, 34 Fed. 121 (C. C. Colo. 1888). See Note, 9 A. L. X.
931 (1920).
3. Cawrse v. Signal Oil Co., 164 Ore. 666, 103 P. 2d 729 (1940) ; Witmer v. Valley
National Bank of Des Moines, 223 Iowa 671, 273 N. W. 370 (1937) ; see Note, 129 A. L. I-
179 (1940). For discussion of substitution of "without a privilege to do so" in place of
"malice" in the Restatement see, Winfield, Restatement of the Law of Torts-Volume
il, 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rzv. 1, 13, 14 (1939).
4. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 624, 625, 626 (1938), § 624 provides for liability in
slander of title if defendant, without privilege to do so, publishes false matter disparaging
the title to property and influences the conduct of a third party, which result although not
intended Was foreseeable; § 625 provides for liability in slander of title action although
the defendant'believes in the truth of the disparaging matter; does not act out of ill will,
nor intend to influence the actions of a third party; § 626 provides for liability in trade
libel action iftdefendant, without privilege to do so, publishes a false matter disparaging the
quality of property and influences the conduct of a third party, which result although not
intended was foreseeable.
5. RESTATEMENT, TOaRTS §§ 625 (b), comment c; § 626, comment c (1938).
6. RESTATEMErT, TORTS § 627, 628(2), comment c (1938).
7. Briggs v. Coykendall, 57 N. D. 758, 224 N. W. 202 (1929); Kelly v. First State
Bank of Rothsay, supra; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 647 (1938).
8. Pennsylvania Iron Works Co. v. Henry Vogt Machine Co., 139 Ky. 497, 96 S. W.
551 (1906); RESTATE UFT, TORTS § 649 (1938).
9. Wilson v. Sun Publishing Co.. 85 Wash. 503, 148 Pac. 774 (1915).
10. REsTATrmENT, TORTS § 650 (1938).
